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Background Despite being central to achieving improved population health outcomes,
primary health centres in low- and middle-income settings continue to
underperform. Little research exists to adequately explain how and why this is
the case. This study aimed to test the relevance and usefulness of an adapted
conceptual framework for improving our understanding of the mechanisms and
causal pathways influencing primary health centre performance.
Methods A theory-driven, case-study approach was adopted. Four Zambian health centres
were purposefully selected with case data including health-care worker inter-
views (n¼ 60); patient interviews (n¼ 180); direct observation of facility
operations (2 weeks/centre) and key informant interviews (n¼ 14). Data were
analysed to understand how the performance of each site was influenced by the
dynamic interactions between system ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ acting on
mechanisms of accountability.
Findings Structural constraints including limited resources created challenging service
environments in which work overload and stockouts were common. Health
workers’ frustration with such conditions interacted with dissatisfaction with
salary levels eroding service values and acting as a catalyst for different forms of
absenteeism. Such behaviours exacerbated patient–provider ratios and increased
the frequency of clinical and administrative shortcuts. Weak health information
systems and lack of performance data undermined providers’ answerability to
their employer and clients, and a lack of effective sanctions undermined
supervisors’ ability to hold providers accountable for these transgressions. Weak
answerability and enforceability contributed to a culture of impunity that
masked and condoned weak service performance in all four sites.
Conclusions Health centre performance is influenced by mechanisms of accountability, which
are in turn shaped by dynamic interactions between system hardware and
system software. Our findings confirm the usefulness of combining Sheikh
et al.’s (2011) hardware–software model with Brinkerhoff’s (2004) typology of
accountability to better understand how and why health centre micro-systems
perform (or under-perform) under certain conditions.
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KEY MESSAGES
 Despite being central to achieving improved population health outcomes, primary health centres in low- and middle-
income settings continue to underperform with little research to adequately explain how and why.
 This study aimed to test the relevance and usefulness of an adapted health systems framework for application to micro-
level health systems
 Findings demonstrated that health centre performance is influenced by the dynamic interactions between system
hardware and system software, which act on mechanisms of accountability.
Introduction
Health systems are commonly conceptualized as national,
macro-level entities, with functions spanning the development
of health policies, co-ordination of services and interventions,
and the balancing of cross-sectoral health needs (Fulop et al.
2001; van Olmen et al. 2010). Yet health systems also operate at
the meso-level—with provincial or other sub-national systems
overseeing the adaptation of national policies and guidelines
and implementation of institutional responses (Gilson 2012)—
and at the micro-level—comprising interactions between pro-
viders, patients, managers and citizens.
In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) micro-level
health systems are typically found within a network of primary-
level services such as health centres, clinics and/or health posts
(van Olmen et al. 2010). Although individually modest in scope,
primary-level services are often the only type of formal health
care accessible to a majority of the population (Gormley et al.
2011; Komatsu et al. 2008; Schneider et al. 2006a). As such, they
play a critical role in both population health and broader
human development efforts. Indeed, various international
health initiatives [including in the watershed Alma Ata
Declaration; Millennium Development Goals 4, 5 and 6; and
the post-2015 clarion call for universal health coverage (UHC)]
have, both explicitly and implicitly, recognized the importance
of such services (Victora et al. 2013; Vega 2013; Shelton 2013;
Ooms et al. 2013; Mulley et al. 2013).
Decentralized, equitable and responsive primary health ser-
vices are essential for achieving population health outcomes.
Despite this, research demonstrates that primary-level
health services remain weak across many LMICs, with evi-
dence of inconsistent or low quality of care (Das 2004; Nolan
et al. 2001; Peabody et al. 2006); poor service environments and
drug stockouts (Schneider et al. 2006a); low morale and
negative attitudes among front-line health workers (Bassett
et al. 1997; Jewkes et al. 1998) and irregular or unethical
conduct (Jesani 1998; Maestad and Mwisongo 2011; Sheikh
and Porter 2010).
Lack of guidance on how to address such problems (Gilson
2012; Gilson et al. 2001) is, in part, the result of a skewed
research focus on questions of whether or not primary services
are delivering quality care. By comparison, little empiric
research has focused on questions of how and why primary-
level health services perform in certain ways and under certain
conditions although there are some notable exceptions (Rowe
et al. 2005; Gilson and Daire 2011; Ssengooba et al. 2012;
Schneider et al. 2006b; Schneider et al. 2008; Schneider and
Lehmann 2010; Schneider and Palmer 2002).
The study reported here formed part of a larger research
project assessing the impact of HIV service scale-up on front-
line health-centre operations in Zambia. Recognizing the dearth
of exploratory and explanatory research in this area, a specific
objective of the larger study was to first produce theoretically
informed insights relating to the mechanisms driving health-
centre performance, in order to better understand the ways in
which HIV care and treatment services influenced these
services. In this article we report findings from this first
objective.
Methods
Study setting
At the time of study Zambia’s health system was relatively
centralized with the Ministry of Health (MOH) responsible for
all national health policies as well for direct oversight of tertiary
hospital operations. Responsibility for the network of 1500 first
and second level health facilities (primary health centres and
first and second level hospitals) lay with Provincial and District
Health Offices (Figure 1).
Primary health centres make up the majority (79%) of
Zambia’s health facilities with approximately 29% located in
in urban areas. Officially, urban health centres serve a catch-
ment population of 30 000 to 50 000, while rural health centres
serve a population of up to 10 000 MOH, GRZ (2007).
Depending on location and resourcing, urban and rural health
centres may include any combination of an outpatient depart-
ment (OPD), inpatient department (IPD), maternal and child
health department (MCH), labour ward, tuberculosis treatment
department (TB corner), HIV care and treatment department
(HIV department), laboratory and environmental health team
(EHT). The administrative structure of a typical health centre is
outlined in Figure 2.
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Conceptual framework
Both this study and the larger research project were located
within the field of health policy and systems research (HPSR).
This multi-disciplinary domain is informed by insights from
complexity science and systems thinking (de Savigny and
Adams 2009) and can be distinguished from traditional health
services research due to its whole-of-system focus (Gilson and
Daire 2011). Insights from HSPR of particular importance to
this study included the notion that health systems are open
(influenced by the social, political and cultural context in which
they operate); social (shaped by the decisions, actions and
interactions between humans within the system); and dynamic
(continually influenced by the nature and bi-directionality of
interactions between human actors and their environment).
Although such notions have most often been applied to macro-
level health system analyses, it is our contention that they are
equally applicable to micro-level systems including those found
in localized service-delivery platforms such as primary health
centres.
We took as a starting point Sheikh et al.’s (2011) ‘Hardware–
Software’ framework as one of the comparatively few frame-
works adopting an explicitly analytical approach to systems
analysis while also being applicable to micro-level health
systems. The framework posits that health system performance
is not mechanical, but the product of interactions between
system ‘hardware’—defined as tangible or material resources in
a health system, such as infrastructure, drugs, information
systems and human resources—and system ‘software’—intan-
gible components such as the values, power dynamics and norms
that shape the decisions, behaviours and relationships of
actors within the system. Critically, the framework emphasizes
the mutually constitutive nature of the physical and
material, and behavioural and relational components of a
health system, for understanding its overall performance
(K. Sheikh et al. 2011).
Study aims and design
The dual aims of this study were to document and characterize
service operations in four Zambian health centre ‘micro-
systems’ and to use (and adapt as needed) the Hardware–
Software framework to explore how interactions between
different health system components influenced overall health-
centre performance.
In order to address these objectives we adopted a multi-case
study design. Case-study research has explicit strengths in
relation to ‘investigating the complex behaviours of, and relationships
among, actors and agencies as well as for understanding how those
relationships influence institutional change’ (Gilson 2012; Yin 2009).
While much case study research focuses on a single case
(chosen because of its unique or defining characteristics) we
adopted a multi-case design using a theoretical replication
strategy (Yin 2009). Cases were selected (as far as possible) to
confirm or disprove, and subsequently explore the reasons
underpinning, certain patterns of service delivery.
Four health centres, each representing a case unit, were
chosen purposively from two districts within Lusaka Province,
based on established (>36 months) HIV care and treatment
service1 and a catchment population characterizing the health
centre as either a large urban facility (>100 000), small urban
facility (40 000–70 000), peri-urban facility (<40 000) or rural
Figure 1 Ministry of Health Administrative Structure c. 2011. Adapted from Thet (2007).
Arrows indicate channel of authority, financing or influence. DTSS¼Directorate of Technical Support Services; DHRA¼Directorate of Human
Resources and Administration; DPP¼Directorate of Policy and Planning; DPHR¼Directorate of Public Health and Research; DCCD¼Directorate of
Clinical Care and Diagnostic Services.
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facility (<30 000), respectively. A list of all facilities in the
Districts that fitted selection criteria was initially developed and
case selection was conducted in collaboration with District
Medical Officers (DMOs) and local colleagues accounting for
both logistical issues and accessibility. Final selection was
subject to the informed consent of each health centre in-charge.
Data collection
Data were collected between June and December 2011 from
multiple sources in each facility. Table 1 details the principles
used to frame each study phase and Table 2 summarizes data
collection and sampling approach for each method. Methods
included in-depth interviews with a proportionate sample of
health-care workers (HCW); semi-structured interviews with a
quasi-random sample of patients; direct observation of facility
operations (formal, using the National Healthcare Standards
Assessment tool for Zambian Health Facilities, and informal
using research memos to record observations) over several
weeks at each site; key informant interviews with government
and non-government officials, and a review of health centres’
routine (paper-based) health information registers.
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants
(patients, providers and key informants) for any observations or
interviews. The study received ethical clearance from the
Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Melbourne (REF #: 1035194) and the University of Zambia
Biomedical Research Ethics Committee (REF #: 004-03-011).
Analysis
Analysis was carried out in three phases. Phase one was
conducted concurrently with data collection, as collated notes
and summaries of evidence were generated for each health
centre. Transcribed interviews were imported into NVivo QSRTM
for electronic coding. In phase two, data were organized to
produce a case description for each health centre (Yin 2009).
Qualitative and observational data were synthesized and
compared in order to develop as comprehensive a picture as
possible of the operational reality at each site. This phase
included comparison and cross-checking of all data to generate
cohesive and consistent case descriptions and to identify
unusual or exceptional experiences. Preliminary case descrip-
tions were disseminated to the health-centre managers and
DMOs to garner feedback. Phase three focused on cross case
comparisons using both deductive and inductive analysis.
Deductive analysis was guided by codes developed from the
conceptual framework including: system hardware—financing,
governance and human resources; system software—leadership,
workplace norms and patient expectations; accountability—
Figure 2 Typical reporting structure in a Zambian primary health centre.
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incorporating mechanisms for and responses to transparency,
justifiability and enforcement. Coded text and its (anonymized)
source were collated in a word document and printed to enable
synthesis of major findings relating to hardware–software
interactions and their impact on mechanisms of effect within
the health centres. Theoretically generated codes were com-
pared and commonalities identified across the four cases.
Negative case analysis was conducted through the identification
of experiences or interactions that appeared to contradict the
theoretical assumptions underpinning this study. Results and
discussion presented in this article draw most heavily on in-
person observations and provider interviews, but are critically
informed by patient and key informant interviews as well.
Results
Findings from this study are presented in three sections. The
first section provides a summary profile of the four health
centres, evidence of the common service characteristics across
the four sites and the elements of system hardware and
software identified as influential in shaping these characteris-
tics. In the second section we discuss the adaptation of the
Hardware–Software framework to take account of the findings
in the preliminary analysis. Finally, we present findings from
an analysis that used the adapted framework to explore in
greater depth the way hardware/software interactions influ-
enced mechanisms of effect in the health centres, and through
this, overall service performance.
Service profiles
Evidence from our case-data shows that each health centre had
a distinct combination of structural, organizational, relational
and cultural components that produced some differences in
style and quality of care between and within the four sites.
Table 3 summarizes each health centre’s structural and demo-
graphic information and, based on various data sources,
provides a summary description of each facility’s infrastructure
and environmental health, service operations, stewardship and
patient provider relationships.
Health centre 1 (HC1) is an urban facility centrally located in
one of the oldest residential and commercial areas of Zambia’s
capital city. The facility comprises an OPD, MCH department,
TB treatment department, HIV treatment department and a
small in-house laboratory. At the time of study, running water
was available, but not all rooms had taps and not all taps were
working. Infrastructure was rundown in most departments and
environmental health was poor, failing most checks against the
National Healthcare Standards Assessment (NHSA) tool for
Zambian Health Facilities. Observations and provider and
patient interviews demonstrated a heavy emphasis on episodic
Table 1 Processes for ensuring rigour of case-study research
Research
Phase
Principles for
Ensuring Rigour*
Methods Used in this Study
Design Guiding conceptual
theory or framework
Conceptual framework adapted from previous work of Sheikh et al. (2011), and theories of
power and trust in health-care settings. Theory used in case selection triangulation (see
below).
Data collection Justified Case selection Four health centres selected based on assumptions that interaction between system hardware
& software will differ for health centres in urban, peri-urban and rural settings. Selection of
centres from single province was based on timing of HIV service scale-up.
Multiple methods For each health centre: key informant interviews with staff; in-clinic observations; patient
interviews; interviews with administrators and implementing partners.
Sampling Smaller health centres included interviews with all staff & approximately 45 patients.
Larger health centres included interviews with representative sample of staff from each dept
& approximately 45 patients.
Prolonged engagement Case: 2-3 weeks in each facility.
Respondents: At least one formal interview with respondents and informal engagement over
several weeks pre-/post-interview.
Analysis Triangulation Within case: Initial case reports based on triangulation across all data sets for each case
(critical comparison of observation & interview findings), generating overall judgements
about facility-wide experience & notes on variation in health-centre cases.
Cross-case: Initial case reports generated to look for common and differing experiences
across sites, and subsequently compared with theory to assess convergence or divergence.
Negative Case analysis Within case: Identification of experiences that contradicted initial assumptions, drawing on
notes from initial case-data triangulation.
Across-case: cross-case analysis to compare negative cases and test initial assumptions
underpinning the study.
Peer Debriefing & Support Preliminary case reports reviewed by four colleagues (non-government, government &
community-sector) working in Zambian health sector.
Respondent validation Preliminary cross-case analysis presented for review and comment to select respondents
(clinic managers and provincial officials); feedback incorporated into final analysis.
*Source: Gilson et al.(2011).
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and curative services. With the exception of the MCH depart-
ment, little effort was put into preventive services and poor
maintenance of medical records and registers limited the
possibility of follow-up care. Both in-person observations and
qualitative data from patient and provider interviews demon-
strated that quality and responsiveness of care were strongest
in the TB department and weakest in the OPD, where clinical
consultations were cursory and short (averaging <5 minutes/
patient in a quasi-random sample). Patient–provider relations
in the OPD and HIV departments were also very tense, linked to
patients’ perception that waiting times were too long and
health workers inefficient. Reliance on ad hoc communication
by facility management meant there was limited capacity to
systematically address chronic performance issues. Overall, staff
morale was low.
Health centre 2 (HC2) is located in a rural district of Lusaka
Province with a catchment population of 15 000 and travel
distances of up to 25 kilometres. HC2 incorporated an OPD,
HIV, TB and MCH department, laboratory, IPD and labour
ward. At the time of study, the facility had running water but
the plumbing to the laboratory was blocked rendering it out of
service. Additionally, pit latrines for outpatients were full and
out of operation, requiring patients to defecate in an open field
nearby. Power outages occurred regularly and a donor-funded
generator was yet to be connected. Lack of staff and constant
multi-tasking contributed to rapid and often sub-standard
screening practices in the OPD, HIV and MCH departments.
With the exception of the HIV department, medical records and
attendance registers were poorly maintained. Inconsistent
availability of laboratory services weakened the facility’s diag-
nostic capacity. Many routine tasks (e.g. prescription of
antiretroviral therapy and dispensing of medications) were
carried out by staff who lacked training. Health workers
demonstrated comparatively strong teamwork but many ex-
pressed frustration related to weak support by District and
Ministry officials.
Health centre 3 (HC3) is one of the largest primary health
facilities in Lusaka with a catchment population of over 100 000
that is more than double the official ‘ceiling’ for an urban health
centre (MOH and GRZ 2007). At the time of study the facility
housed an OPD, IPD, MCH, TB and HIV department and a
substantial in-house laboratory. Infrastructure was mostly over
50 years old and in poor repair, with the MCH, IPD, OPD and
HIV departments all fairly cramped and poorly ventilated.
Running water and pit latrines were available. MCH and TB
services at HC3 were delivered in a comparatively timely and
respectful manner with providers demonstrating strong rapport
with patients. Observations of staff in the laboratory also
demonstrated a strong sense of mission and internal systems
designed to ensure effective use of limited resources. Within the
partially integrated OPD and HIV departments, however, a
strong professional cohort (full range of clinical staff) was
undermined by weak internal co-ordination and poor integration
of administrative and clinical processes.
Health centre 4 (HC4) is a peri-urban facility located on the
northern periphery of Zambia’s capital city in an unplanned
squatter settlement with no site-and-service water or electricity.
Despite being considered a ‘small’ facility, the health centre
comprises an OPD, HIV, TB and MCH department, IPD, labour
ward and small in-house laboratory. At the time of study,
running water was available but not all rooms had taps.
Electricity failures were a daily occurrence with no generator
back-up. While not exemplary, service delivery in HC4 was
comparatively well integrated. Initiatives to harmonize patient
identification, medical record keeping and patient care path-
ways improved continuity of care for OPD, HIV and TB patients
and was supported by auxiliary workers providing ‘linkage
services’. The recent (facility self-funded) renovation of an in-
house laboratory strengthened HC4’s diagnostic capacity al-
though this service was yet to be fully utilized by on-site
clinicians who were used to making clinical diagnoses.
Despite some clear operational and contextual differences
between the four health centres, the case descriptions revealed
a set of service characteristics common to all facilities and
linked to various common hardware/software interactions.
Described in more detail in Table 4, these shared characteristics
and the hardware/software interactions that influenced them
included:
 Weak continuity of care (influenced by structurally separate
departmental organization and weak inter-cadre
communication),
 Sub-standard clinical practices (influenced by the high patient–
provider ratios and lack of effective quality assurance
mechanisms)
 Skewed focus on curative services (arising from providers’ strong
focus on episodic services and ‘clearing’ the queue and a
general lack of orientation towards preventive care or
patient self-management)
 Confrontational relations between patients and providers (influ-
enced by poor environmental conditions in the facilities and
weak inter-personal trust)
An explicit aim of this research was to move beyond a simple
list of contributing factors in order produce generalizable
assertions about drivers of service quality in health systems.
While the case descriptions were helpful in identifying some of
the common factors, this analysis falls short of providing an
analytical frame for understanding health system performance
more generally. With the aim of developing a deeper under-
standing of how these hardware–software interactions influ-
enced health centre performance we thus adapted Sheikh et al.’s
(2011) framework (Figure 3) to incorporate more explicit
mechanisms of effect that shape service delivery across the
four sites.
Based on our case analysis that demonstrated how provider
behaviours and attitudes were a key determinant of service
quality, and supported by a cross-disciplinary literature review,
we came to focus on two mechanisms—those of accountability
and trust—as central determinants of quality and responsive
service delivery (Gilson et al. 2005; Rittenhouse et al. 2009). In
this article we focus primarily on the findings in relation to
accountability with future papers dedicated to an exploration of
trust.
We adapted Brinkerhoff’s (2003, 2004) typology of
accountability2 in order to focus more closely on two domains
relevant to front-line health services; that is administra-
tive and social accountability. Although both domains
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relate to provider performance, the former—administrative
accountability—represents ‘upwards’ accountability to super-
visors and managers with reference to established policies,
guidelines and clinical standards. The latter—social account-
ability—represents ‘downwards’ accountability to meet the
needs and expectations of patients and community members.
While our larger analysis focused on both administrative and
social accountability, this article (in the interests of brevity)
focuses exclusively on administrative accountability.
Following Brinkherhoff, we understand administrative ac-
countability to be the product of two interconnected mechan-
isms—answerability and enforceability. Mechanisms of
answerability provide information that makes transparent and
justifies the nature of health providers’ decisions or actions.
Examples of such mechanisms include clinical performance
reviews or routine data on service quality and coverage.
Mechanisms of enforceability provide a form of reward or
sanction when providers succeed or fail to meet these pre-
defined standards (Brinkerhoff 2004) and in this setting may
include disciplinary measures, performance incentives and so
forth.
Overall, we theorized that dynamic interactions between
system hardware and system software influence mechanisms of
answerability and enforceability, and through these, the pro-
duction of accountability (administrative and social) in each
health centre as a whole (Figure 3). Based on our first round
analysis, we also theorized that these mechanisms are mediated
by the trust and power dynamics inherent to the relationships
between actors within the health system—although this
remains a secondary focus of this particular article. As with
Sheikh et al.’s (2011) original, the adapted framework
recognizes that health systems are open and social and subject
to contextual influences from larger systems in which they are
embedded and the broader social and political environments in
which they operate.
Findings in relation to mechanisms of answerability
In the context of Zambian health-centre operations, effective
mechanisms of administrative answerability should enable
health-centre managers and/or District officials to request
information about a provider or health-centre’s performance,
and would ensure they were capable of, and willing to, supply
that information. In the health centres in this study mechan-
isms of answerability included documentation of service
activities in medical records, hard-copy registers and tally
sheets, production of summary activity reports, and perform-
ance review and feedback from District administrators.
Data from our case findings indicated that, in general,
mechanisms of administrative answerability were weak with a
variety of hardware–software interactions contributing.
Perhaps the most significant hardware factor was the chronic
human resource shortage experienced across all four sites. Staff
shortages not only impeded the provision of quality services
(directly undermining health workers’ capacity to make good
on their service obligations) but also impeded the timely and
accurate collection of health information about those services.
Table 4 Characteristics of service delivery and contributing factors
Features of De Facto
service delivery
Supporting evidence Hardware factors (human re-
sources, health information,
drugs and equipment)
Software factors (values, norms,
power relations)
Weak continuity * Inconsistent availability/provision
of basic care package
* Lack of follow-up services for
patients
* Fragmented data & health info
systems
* Physically separated point-of-care
services
* Weak capacity to interpret service-
level data
* Service culture oriented to rapid/
episodic care
* Service norms shaped by factory-
like operations vs integrated
team-work
* Weak leadership unable to chal-
lenge prevailing service norms
Sub-Standard clinical &
administrative practices
* Frequent ‘shortcuts’ in delivery of
services and administration
* Services delivered by untrained
and/or unsupervised staff
* Unsafe practices (e.g. sharps
storage)
* Lack of discretionary funding
* Insufficient clinic space
* Commodity stock-outs
* Staff shortages & unregulated
task-shifting
* Weak performance data & lack of
effective regulatory mechanisms
* Provider perceptions that they are
under-resourced & chronically
overworked
* Weak facility / District supervision
* Patient & providers prioritize ser-
vice speed vs service quality
* Work norms enable frequent staff
absenteeism
Episodic care * Short patient consultation times
* Absence of clinician counselling
* Weak preventive services
* Chronic HR shortages
* Underfunded primary-care
activities
* Weak regulatory capacity at
District level
* Rapid staff turnover
* Service-culture oriented to rapid
consultation
Confrontational care * Frequent verbal complaints by
patients
* Abusive treatment of patients by
HCW
* Chronic staff shortages
* Poor work conditions
* Drugs stockouts
* Lack of / broken equipment
* Weak mechanisms of social ac-
countability (e.g. complaint or
feedback system)
* Providers’ perception of being
overworked & underpaid
* Providers perceive many patients
as overly demanding or having
bogus ailments
* Information / power asymmetry
between patients & providers
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Health-care workers interviewed in all four facilities described
the time pressure they experienced and the impact this had on
their clinical and administrative performance.
When you are examining 300 patients in five hours you are
literally saying two [sic] minutes per patient. The patients can’t
express themselves [in that time]; so you use what we call spotter
diagnosis. You look at the patient and see, well, is he sick or not?
Then you move on. Clinician, HC3
Lack of time to complete point-of-care data or summary
reports led many professional HCW to delegate (‘task shift’)
data-entry and data collation tasks to auxiliary staff. Some
auxiliary workers were highly competent and demonstrated the
capacity to take on these additional tasks quickly and effi-
ciently. Others (such as the cleaner responsible for dispensing
drugs to OPD patients in HC2) had weak literacy and almost no
training and little capacity to maintain records. Auxiliary
workers were receiving either very small stipends or no
payment at all, and were required to take on informal
responsibilities as well as completing the ‘core’ tasks for
which they had been originally recruited. Structural human
resource shortages (a hardware factor) thus contributed to a
high burden of work and pressure to complete tasks quickly,
which, compounded in some cases by lack of capacity,
contributed to data-entry errors, shortcuts or shirking of these
duties altogether.
Exacerbating staff shortages, the cumbersome nature of the
hard-copy data-collection tools added to time pressures that
affected both clinical and administrative standards. Tally sheets
and health-centre registers, for example, involved complicated
and sometimes repetitive entries that were frequently difficult
to interpret. Where official registers were available, both
professional and auxiliary staff complained that data entry
was overly time-consuming (Filling those tally sheets is complicated
and just takes time; so we would prefer to concentrate on the next
patient. Clinician, HC3). During the period of study, moreover,
HC1 and HC2 were observed to lack several up-to-date registers,
resulting in temporary and improvised data collection tools that
did not mirror official documents.
Observations and interview findings demonstrated that
monthly reports collated from health-centre registers were
generally compiled hastily and with few, if any, quality checks.
As one nurse observed: after we compile our report we don’t sit down
to say: ‘was it done correctly?’ or ‘what does it tell us?’ Everybody just
does their own report [and] someone hands it to the District. (Nurse,
HC2). The poor quality of data entry and reporting undermined
providers’ answerability to District officials. The ad hoc and
often impersonal nature of the performance reviews further
weakened the efficacy of this mechanism. While some providers
(e.g. HC1, 3) described performance reviews in a positive light
(we can see our strengths and our weaknesses; Nurse, HC3), many
others complained that they were unhelpful: because by the time
you get it you will have forgotten what they are reporting on;
Nurse; HC4.
Findings in relation to mechanisms of enforceability
In the context of primary health-centre operations, effective
mechanisms of administrative enforceability should enable
health-centre managers or District administrators to invoke
positive rewards for good performance, or sanctions for
inappropriate behaviour or poor performance. In the Zambian
context, we found that there were comparatively few formal
mechanisms of enforceability. Poor performance of any sort
could be disciplined via a formal system of written warning
letters issued by an overall in-charge and referred upwards
through the District, Provincial and Ministry administration.
However, the bureaucratic nature of this sanction meant that
formal decisions could take months and as one in-charge
explained:
The Ministry system [. . .] can be quite difficult because you have
civil service rules, where to give warnings everything goes in written
form. It’s not you who can [act on the problem]. You have to
recommend. Then the recommendation goes to [the District] and
then to the Province, and then [the Ministry of Health]. It
takes forever and ever. Now you can suspend a few people but even
then it’s tedious. And to fire is even more difficult. In-Charge,
HC3
A second formal mechanism of enforceability was the use of
horizontal transfers either within, or between, health centres.
Transfers were described by one District official as a pre-
emptive mechanism to ‘keep health care workers on their toes’
District Official, as well as a sanction used on those not
performing to standard. Yet as another official noted: ‘we have
those transfers [. . .] but then the transfer does not change the health-
care worker. They take their problems to the new place and infect it
too’; District Official. Continued reliance on such highly
centralised and weakly regulated sanctions constituted an
ongoing impediment to enforceability within these clinics.
We identified no formal mechanisms to reward strong
performance, although some in-charges described their own
improvised mechanisms of reward, such as approving informal
Figure 3 Conceptual framework for analysis of health micro-systems
(adapted from Sheikh et al., 2011).
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(non-recorded) days-off on the implicit agreement that profes-
sional staff would work harder on their remaining rostered
shifts (HC4).3
Beyond the limited formal disciplinary sanctions, weak
enforceability in the four health centres was also influenced
by software factors including the power dynamics between
different health worker cadres and the leadership qualities of
various in-charges. Findings indicated that in all four facilities
there was a tension between the administrative hierarchy (from
which in-charges drew their authority) and the medical
hierarchy in which clinicians, based on their more prestigious
training, were senior. In all but one of the health centres (HC4)
the overall in-charge was a registered nurse and implicit
tension was evident in the comments of several clinical officers
regarding the competency of their administrative superior.
You know ideally, the administration of clinics is supposed to be
done by the clinical officers, [because] we know how to run a
clinic. Apart from administration, we know how to deal with the
community. And we can mobilise people that are influential,
politicians for instance. Nurses have no training for that
Clinician, HC3.
Such tensions undermined in-charges’ authority (albeit to
varying degrees), making it more difficult for nurse managers
to bring sanctions to bear on providers above them or on equal
standing in the medical hierarchy (I was hoping that the Clinical
Officer would come back before I write [to the District] . . . this is the
third week [she has been absent] without a reason; In-Charge HC3/
With respect to leading [. . .] the challenges are there in every aspect,
especially if you are not a doctor. You have to be tactical; EHT, HC2).
Weak leadership skills constituted an additional barrier to
administrative enforceability. Although the in-charges inter-
viewed in this study were clearly well intentioned, many lacked
the capacity or where with all to enforce performance standards
among their frequently disaffected staff. Direct observation in
all sites demonstrated that most managers focussed their
energy on administrative functions such as creating staff
rosters and monthly reports while performance-related issues
were often deferred or, where possible, referred to the next level
of authority (There are certain challenges with the [but] it’s
incredibly difficult and usually I hand over to my [supervisor]; Dept.
In-Charge HC4).
Weak capacity to lead or affect attitudinal change was
manifest in various in-charges’ descriptions of their interaction
with their staff. In all four sites, for example, departmental in-
charges reported how some professional staff would only
perform to standard if their supervisor was physically present
(They expect me to be there, my actual presence, to say ‘do this, do this,
like this’. If I’m not there in person, well [. . .]; Dept. In-Charge,
HC2). Others described cases where professional staff had
threatened poor performance or absenteeism if they were
criticized by their superiors (When you are good, [your staff] also
become good. But if you are harsh and criticize them, they are also
harsh. They will come in late or just take sick days to punish you as the
in-charge; Dept. In-Charge, HC3).
Moreover, many departmental and overall in-charges
expressed a sense of hopelessness in relation to holding their
staff accountable (they always have excuses, so there is nothing you
can do. There is nothing I can do; Dept. In-Charge, HC4) with
several describing how they adopted consciously liberal
approach to enforcing performance standards in order to cope
(They just don’t care. And you can’t make them; In-Charge HC4/ You
just have to understand they are human beings; they have got their
own personal programs they need to attend to; In-Charge, HC1).
Previous research has demonstrated that facility-level over-
sight or regulatory capacity can be weakened where material
and human resource constraints are already a factor (Bloom
and Standing 2008). While such hardware factors were
certainly a consideration in this setting, the quality and
capacity of individual in-charges remained a distinct factor, as
a district official noted: the in-charges, they are the managers of
these health facilities. But it’s not [all of them] who have that
leadership skill. Some only rise up just because they are the most senior;
District Official.
This interpretation is supported by two exceptions to the more
general finding of weak leadership identified in this study and
outlined in Box 1. These examples provide insight into the way
strong(er) leadership, as oppose to formal disciplinary mechan-
isms, may influence the production of accountability by
appealing to providers’ service-values. The exceptional leader-
ship in HC4 also demonstrates how accountability may be
effectively enforced even in systems that are otherwise
generally weak.
A culture of impunity
Brinkerhoff (2003) notes that the ‘ability of overseeing actor(s) to
impose punishment [. . .] for failures and transgressions [is what] gives
‘teeth’ to accountability’. He asserts, moreover, that the presence
of de jure sanctions without the de facto capacity to enforce
them may diminish or lead to a general failure in administra-
tive accountability, contributing to a series of work norms that
underpin a ‘culture of impunity’. Work or social norms are
expectations shared by members of a group about appropriate
ways to behave in given situations (Marshall 2009). They
represent the potential pressure or expectations that form the
basis of decisions about how to behave or interact and provide
a yard-stick or referent for members of a group to assess
themselves. In the sense that norms may increase (in both
positive and negative ways) feelings of personal and group
identity, research has demonstrated how they help shape health
providers’ behaviour by providing limits within which indivi-
duals receive social approval (or at least avoid overt disap-
proval) (Dabney 1995; Ehrhart and Naumann 2004).
In the four health centres in this study, we found evidence of
three particular service patterns underpinned by permissive
work norms that permeated the health centre setting.
The first was laxity in relation to clinical and administrative
standards. This included avoidance of measuring patients’ vital
signs (HC1, 2, 3), repackaging of bulk-delivered drugs into
single-dose packets without counting the dose (HC 1, 3, 4) and
clinicians skipping physical examinations (HC1, 2, 3, 4). These
short cuts and omissions were linked to a second work
pattern—queue clearing—characterized by rapid consultations
in which providers aimed to ‘clear’ patient queues as quickly as
possible in order to be able ‘to relax and refresh a bit’; Midwife,
HC2, or, to leave the clinic altogether.
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A third work pattern suggestive of permissive work norms
and a culture of impunity was the frequency of absenteeism.
The most common form of absenteeism was tardiness,
including late arrival and early departures from work. In the
urban and peri-urban facilities (HC1, 3, 4) providers’ linked
their tardiness with ‘moonlighting or ‘double shifting’ and
justified these behaviours as a way of supplementing their
income (we don’t just depend on this clinic, we have to do other part
time [jobs]; Nurse HC1). Providers linked their need to take on
additional work to poor public sector salaries and benefits
(when you calculate for a month, then you get a small salary, that
can’t even sustain you; Clinician, HC3 / The way we are working is
not OK. There are no uniforms, no transport refund, and people get to
work late because of that; Nurse, HC4). In the rural facility (HC2),
there were few opportunities to moonlight, but direct observa-
tion demonstrated that professional staff nonetheless operated
significantly shorter (daytime) hours than the official schedule.
In this rural setting the perception of overwork and the need to
rest and recuperate were the primary justifications for fore-
shortened hours.
Another common type of absenteeism was duty station
absence, most frequently observed in the larger departments
(OPD, HIV) in the urban and peri-urban facilities (HC1, 3, 4).
During interviews, providers attributed their duty station
absences to the constant pressure to multi-task. While this
pressure was real, some providers deliberately took advantage
of the scattered nature of their work. In HC3, for example, five
nurses were routinely allocated to the OPD during the morning,
but during four separate observed morning shifts, between one
and three of these nurses were absent from their duty station
by mid-morning and subsequently located in the staff lounge.
Clinical officers and/or the doctor working in the OPD in HC3
were also observed to be absent from their station on six
occasions across the study period, five of which were afternoon
shifts. In both HC1 and HC4, a number of nurses working in
the outpatient and HIV departments during the afternoon shift
were observed absent from their duty stations, later to be
located in the pharmacy (nominally counting medication into
packages). Such practices were not one-off occurrences, but
represented consistent work patterns underpinned by permis-
sive work norms.
Discussion
This study contributes to the limited body of theoretically
informed empirical work exploring mechanisms of effect at the
micro-level in low-resource health systems.
Challenging the implicit assumptions of more reductionist
health system frameworks, our findings illuminate the com-
plex, social and adaptive nature of micro-level health systems
and demonstrate the usefulness of combining Sheikh et al.’s
(2011) hardware–software model with a typology of account-
ability in order to explain how and why primary-level health
services perform (or under-perform) under certain conditions.
The quality and responsiveness of service delivery within
primary-level health facilities are demonstrably influenced by
mechanisms of accountability, which are in turn influenced by
a range of hardware–software interactions. In the case of the
four health centres in this study, structural constraints such as
limited material and human resources (system hardware)
created incredibly difficult service environments for health
workers in which work overload and resource shortages were
common.
In many health systems, including Zambia’s, hardware factors
such as human resourcing, health financing and drug and
procurement systems lie largely beyond the control of front-line
providers. This challenge is reflective of ‘principal-agent’ issue
discussed in health related accountability literature
(Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008; Buchanan 1988; Smith et al.
1997) in which state actors cannot be held fully responsible for
BOX 1. Strong leadership
Example 1: A former overall in-charge at Health Centre 2 was described by both professional and auxiliary staff as an
unusually strong leader with ‘strategic’ capacity.
The [former in-charge] was unusual. [. . .] He was very creative, very tactical and he wanted to do things in the right way. He was a
motivator [. . .] everyone liked him very much. Environmental Health Technologist, HC2
He was tough, but kind and intelligent. He was tough, in the sense that, whatever he wants done, he wants it done. If you were assigned to
do something and you did not do it, you would not be on good terms with him. But even then, he used to find out why you didn’t do it and
he would help you. He might be annoyed, but at the end of the day he would still come back to you and help you finish. Lay Counsellor,
HC2.
Example 2: The overall in-charge at Health Centre 4 displayed a strong commitment to hands-on leadership and an ability
to overcome the ineffectual formal sanctions through active and persuasive communication. This was illustrated in the
account of a laboratory technologist who described how the overall in-charge dealt with the reticence of clinical officers to
make use of the clinic’s new laboratory facilities.
When the [clinicians] were not sending any patients to the lab [because they were used to conducting one-off clinical assessments] the in-
charge was on his feet trying to sensitize members of staff to use the lab. He was preaching every day and now it’s getting there, they’re
starting to shift. Lab Tech, HC4.
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performance due to the hierarchy and multiple levels of
delegation that impede decision-making and/or action. Indeed,
providers in this study emphatically described the locus of
control for their own and their health centres’ wider perform-
ance as being largely external, making assertions such as ‘we
have no option’ when it came to delivering sub-standard care.
Despite this, our findings clearly demonstrate the way
providers’ personal choices and actions also influence service
quality and responsiveness. Providers’ frustration with poor
work conditions, for example, interacted with widespread
dissatisfaction with salary levels to erode service-values and
act as a catalyst in many individuals’ decision to seek other
forms of compensation (moonlighting) or to foreshorten work
hours. Such behaviours, in turn, exacerbated the high patient–
provider ratios and increased the frequency of clinical and/or
administrative shortcuts.
In both Sheikh et al.’s original Hardware–Software model and
our adaption, it is theorized that values and norms play an
important role in health system performance. Our findings
confirm that, inter-cadre tensions aside, providers’ almost
universally identified as ‘overworked public service health
providers’. Based on a common understanding of certain
practices (notably various forms of absenteeism) as a form of
compensation for the real or perceived work pressures
associated with this role, certain work patterns became
accepted norms within the health-centre settings irrespective
of the fact that these practices ran counter to providers‘ service
mission. Weak health information systems produced little
useful performance data to expose these work patterns, while
facility managers—who were well aware of the problem—
generally lacked the power or the leadership skills to challenge
them.
Despite having little power to shape the formal organizational
structure or environmental conditions of their work place,
providers were thus able to exercise considerable influence over
service quality and responsiveness via work norms that
constituted a source of ‘hidden’ power. The consistency of the
data in relation these findings, as well as the authors’
experience in other facilities around Zambia, suggest that
these work norms are likely influencing the ethos and service
patterns of the Zambian public health sector at large.
Policy implications
Traditionally, primary-level service interventions in LMIC have
tended to focus on elements of system ‘hardware’—most
notably through training or similar ‘up-skilling’ programmes
or allocations of new resources. Confirming a basic hypothesis
of our conceptual framework, which emphasizes the social and
adaptive nature of health systems, our findings demonstrate
that system software such as work norms and providers’ service
values play an equally important role in determining health-
centre performance.
The importance of health system software has long been a
focus of research in high-income settings, notably in the
organizational management and quality improvement litera-
ture. What our findings highlight, is that far more work must
be done to ensure that interventions in LMIC are equally
holistically developed in order to take explicit account of the
social adaptation and responsivness of human actors in these
systems. This is particularly important to avoid ‘blaming’
software factors for performance breakdowns, when structural
conditions play such a central role in shaping the conditions for
such failures.
Our findings point to specific opportunities in the Zambia
setting vis-a`-vis strengthening mechanisms of answerability
and enforceability. These include stronger production, analysis
and flow of both health and service information enabling
individual performance review, decentralized disciplinary mech-
anisms and greater investment in facility-level leadership
capacity.
Analytical and methodological considerations
The approach to health systems analysis adopted in this
research makes explicit reference to the context-specificity.
Since every context, by definition, is unique, it could be argued
that the findings presented here are specific to the experience
of the four health centres. We have sought to address this
limitation by presenting data specific to each case and the
Zambian setting separately from the theoretical discussion, to
allow readers to more easily assess the relevance of the
examples in this study to their own or other settings. To the
extent possible, we tried to maintain a distinction between
the context specific analysis that addressed the study’s ‘how’
and ‘why’ questions on the one hand, and theoretical insights
related to health system performance more generally.
We acknowledge that the research team’s disciplinary and
professional background (including significant prior experience
working in Zambian health centres) represents a potential
source of bias that may have predisposed the team to
understand and analyse certain issues in certain ways.
However, this experience also provided specific advantages,
including a deeper understanding of the context in which the
health centres were operating and the complex and often
apparently paradoxical nature of providers’ and patients’
actions, decisions and relationships.
Although beyond the scope of this particular analysis, more
detailed examination of the role that power dynamics and
various forms of trust have on the production of accountability
in this setting, is also warranted. Such research could contrib-
ute substantially to the development of context-appropriate
interventions to strengthen behavioural and relational compo-
nents of health-centre operations. (Gilson 2003; McPake and
Mills 2000).
Conclusion
Strong health systems are critical not only for delivering health
services to those who have fallen ill (often the most vulnerable
in society) but also for providing redress to deeply embedded
social inequities (Freedman et al. 2005). Within health systems
of LMIC such as Zambia, primary health centres represent the
most basic type of formal health care. Understanding how and
why such services operate is critical to providing guidance in
relation to strengthening their performance in the long term.
Resonating strongly with the hypothesis that local health
systems should be understood as complex and adaptive in their
own right this study revealed many otherwise hidden dynamics
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and interactions that shaped health-centre performance. The
findings confirm the relevance of the Sheikh et al.’s (2011)
hardware–software model and demonstrates how the original
framework may be adapted to achieve greater analytical and
explanatory power by examining first, the way hardware–
software interactions act positively or negatively on particular
mechanisms of accountability, and through these, health
system performance. The study constitutes an important con-
tribution to the field of health policy and systems research,
generating findings that may act as a building block within this
still emerging field and be replicated and further tested in other
settings.
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Endnotes
1 Since one of the study’s overall goals was to assess the impact of
introducing HIV services into primary health centres, this was a
necessary criteria.
2 Brinkerhoff refers to these domains as ‘performance’ and ‘political’
accountability respectively with his analyses focusing largely on
macro-level accountability of governments to their citizens.
3 Unfortunately this mechanism resulted in even worse provider-
to-patient ratios with the perverse outcome of increasing the
pressure on staff to engage in ‘queue clearing’ and shortcuts,
effectively undermining the reason for the incentive in the first
place.
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